



Capitalism and Culture

A New Phase of Global Interaction

SINCE 1945



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“I think every Barbie doll is more harmful than an American missile,” declared Iranian toy seller Masoumeh Rahimi in 2002. To Rahimi, Barbie’s revealing clothing, her shapely appearance, and her close association with Ken, her longtime unmarried companion, were “foreign to Iran’s culture.” Thus Rahimi warmly welcomed the arrival of Sara and Dara, two Iranian Muslim dolls meant to counteract the negative influence of Barbie and Ken, who had long dominated Iran’s toy market. Sara and her brother, Dara, represented eight-year-old twins. Sara came complete with a headscarf to cover her hair in modest Muslim fashion and a full-length white chador enveloping her from head to toe. They were described as helping each other solve problems, while looking to their loving parents for guidance, hardly the message that Barbie and Ken conveyed.¹

The widespread availability of Barbie in Muslim Iran provides one small example of the power of global commerce in the world of the early twenty-first century. The creation of Sara and Dara illustrates resistance to the cultural values associated with this American product. Still, Sara and Barbie had something in common: both were manufactured in China. This triangular relationship of the United States, Iran, and China neatly symbolized the growing integration of world economies and cultures as well as the divergences and conflicts that this process generated. Those linked but contrasting patterns are the twin themes of this final chapter.

DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, AN INCREASINGLY DENSE WEB OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS, economic transactions, and cultural influences

One World: This NASA photograph, showing both the earth and the moon, reveals none of the national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic boundaries that have long divided humankind. Such pictures have both reflected and helped create a new planetary consciousness among growing numbers of people. (Image created by Reto Stockli, Nazmi El Saleous, and Marit Jentoft-Nilsen, NASA GSFC)

cut across the world's many peoples, countries, and regions, binding them together more tightly, but also more contentiously. By the 1990s, this process of accelerating engagement among distant peoples was widely known as globalization.

Although the term was relatively new, the process was not. From the viewpoint of world history, the genealogy of globalization reached far into the past. The Arab, Mongol, Russian, Chinese, and Ottoman empires; the Silk Road, Indian Ocean, and trans-Saharan trade routes; the spread of Buddhism, Christianity, and especially Islam—all of these connections had long linked the societies of the Eastern Hemisphere, bringing new rulers, religions, products, diseases, and technologies to many of its peoples. Later, in the centuries after 1500, European maritime voyages and colonizing efforts launched the Columbian exchange, incorporating the Western Hemisphere and inner Africa firmly and permanently into a genuinely global network of communication, exchange, and often exploitation. During the nineteenth century, as the Industrial Revolution took hold and Western nations began a new round of empire building in Asia and Africa, that global network tightened further, and its role as generator of social and cultural change only increased.

These were the foundations on which twentieth-century globalization was built. A number of prominent developments of the past century, explored in the previous three chapters, operated on a global scale: the world wars, the Great Depression, com-

munism, the cold war, the end of empire, and the growing prominence of developing countries. But global interaction quickened its pace and deepened its impact after World War II, an acceleration illustrated by four major processes: the transformation of the world economy, the emergence of global feminism, the confrontation of world religions with modernity, and the growing awareness of humankind's enormous impact on the environment.

SEEKING THE MAIN POINT

To what extent has globalization fostered converging values and common interests among the world's peoples? In what ways has it generated new conflicts among them?

The Transformation of the World Economy

■ Change

What factors contributed to economic globalization in the second half of the twentieth century?

When most people speak of globalization, they are referring to the immense acceleration in international economic transactions that took place in the second half of the twentieth century and continued into the twenty-first. Many have come to see this process as almost natural, certainly inevitable, and practically unstoppable. Yet the first half of the twentieth century, particularly the decades between the two world wars, witnessed a deep contraction of global economic linkages as the aftermath of World War I and then the Great Depression wreaked havoc on the world economy. International trade, investment, and labor migration dropped sharply as major states turned inward, favoring high tariffs and economic autonomy in the face of a global economic collapse.

The aftermath of World War II was very different. The capitalist victors in that conflict, led by the United States, were determined to avoid any return to such Depression-era conditions. At a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, they forged a set of agreements and institutions (the World Bank and the In-

A Map of Time

1919–1946	League of Nations
1945	United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund established
1960	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries founded
1962	Rachel Carson publishes <i>Silent Spring</i>
1963	Betty Friedan publishes <i>Feminine Mystique</i>
1970	Greenpeace established
1979	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women adopted by UN
1979	Iranian revolution
1982	Law of the Sea Convention introduced
1994	NAFTA enacted
1995	World Trade Organization created
1997	Kyoto Protocol on global warming introduced
2001	Sept. 11 attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon
2008	Global economic crisis begins
2011	Osama bin Laden killed

ternational Monetary Fund [IMF]) that laid the foundation for postwar globalization. This “Bretton Woods system” negotiated the rules for commercial and financial dealings among the major capitalist countries, while promoting relatively free trade, stable currency values linked to the U.S. dollar, and high levels of capital investment.

Technology also contributed to the acceleration of economic globalization. Containerized shipping, huge oil tankers, and air express services dramatically lowered transportation costs, while fiber-optic cables and later the Internet provided the communication infrastructure for global economic interaction. In the developing countries, population growth, especially when tied to growing economies and modernizing societies, further fueled globalization as dozens of new nations entered the world economy.

The kind of economic globalization taking shape in the 1970s and after was widely known as neoliberalism. Major capitalist countries such as the United States and Great Britain abandoned many earlier political controls on economic activity as their leaders and businesspeople increasingly viewed the entire world as a single market. This approach to the world economy favored the reduction of tariffs, the free global movement of capital, a mobile and temporary workforce, the privatization of many state-run enterprises, the curtailing of government efforts to regulate the economy, and both tax and spending cuts. Powerful international lending agencies such as the World Bank

and the IMF imposed such free market and pro-business conditions on many poor countries if they were to qualify for much-needed loans. The collapse of the state-controlled economies of the communist world only furthered such unrestricted global capitalism. In this view, the market, operating both globally and within nations, was the most effective means of generating the holy grail of economic growth. As communism collapsed by the end of the twentieth century, “capitalism was global and the globe was capitalist.”²

Reglobalization

■ Connection

In what ways has economic globalization more closely linked the world's peoples?

These conditions provided the foundations for a dramatic quickening of global economic transactions after World War II, a “reglobalization” of the world economy following the contractions of the 1930s. This immensely significant process was expressed in the accelerating circulation of goods, capital, and people.

World trade, for example, skyrocketed from a value of some \$57 billion in 1947 to about \$16 trillion in 2009. Department stores and supermarkets around the world stocked their shelves with goods from every part of the globe. Twinings of London marketed its 120 blends of tea in more than 100 countries, and the Australian-based Kiwi shoe polish was sold in 180 countries. In 2005, about 70 percent of Walmart products reportedly included components from China. And the following year, Toyota replaced General Motors as the world's largest automaker with manufacturing facilities in at least eighteen countries.


Money as well as goods achieved an amazing global mobility in three ways. The first was “foreign direct investment,” whereby a firm in, say, the United States

opens a factory in China or Mexico (see Map 23.1 and Visual Source 23.1, p. 1183). Such investment exploded after 1960 as companies in rich countries sought to take advantage of cheap labor, tax breaks, and looser environmental regulations in developing countries. A second form of money in motion has been the short-term movement of capital, in which investors annually spent trillions of dollars purchasing foreign currencies or stocks likely to increase in value and often sold them quickly thereafter, with unsettling consequences. A third form of money movement involved the personal funds of individuals. By the end of the twentieth century, international credit cards had taken hold almost everywhere, allowing for easy transfer of



A World Economy

Indian-based call centers that serve North American or European companies and customers have become a common experience of globalization for many. Here employees in one such call center in Patna, a major city in northeastern India, undergo voice training in order to communicate more effectively with their English-speaking callers. (Indiapicture/Alamy)



Map 23.1 Globalization in Action: Foreign Direct Investment in the Late Twentieth Century

Investment across national borders has been a major expression of globalization. This map shows the global distribution of investment inflows as of 1998. Notice which countries or regions were receiving the most investment from abroad and which received the least. How might you account for this pattern? Keep in mind that some regions, such as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, were major sources of such investment as well as recipients of it.

money across national borders. In 2012, MasterCard was accepted at some 33 million businesses in 220 countries or territories.

Central to the acceleration of economic globalization have been huge global businesses known as transnational corporations (TNCs), which produce goods or deliver services simultaneously in many countries. For example, Mattel Corporation produced Barbie, that quintessentially American doll, in factories located in Indonesia, Malaysia, and China, using molds from the United States, plastic and hair from Taiwan and Japan, and cotton cloth from China. From distribution centers in Hong Kong, more than a billion Barbies were sold in 150 countries by 1999. Burgeoning in number since the 1960s, those TNCs, such as Royal Dutch Shell, Sony, and General Motors, often were of such an enormous size and had such economic clout that their assets and power dwarfed that of many countries. By 2000, 51 of the world's 100 largest economic units were in fact TNCs, not countries. In the permissive economic climate of

recent decades, such firms have been able to move their facilities quickly from place to place in search of the lowest labor costs or the least restrictive environmental regulations. During one five-year period, for example, Nike closed twenty factories and opened thirty-five others, often thousands of miles apart.

Accompanying the movement of goods and capital in the globalizing world of the twentieth century were new patterns of human migration, driven by war, revolution, poverty, and the end of empire. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I witnessed the “repatriation” of over a million Greeks from Turkey, while some 400,000 Turks moved in the other direction. Fleeing anti-Semitism, fascism, and the Holocaust, Jews emigrated to what is now Israel in large numbers, generating in the process a flow of Palestinian refugees to squalid settlements in neighboring countries. Political repression and forced labor in the Soviet Union pushed millions into the camps of gulag, primarily in Siberia. In South Africa, an industrializing economy and apartheid policies drew millions of male workers from the countryside into mines and factories, often under horrific conditions.

But perhaps the most significant pattern of global migration since the 1960s has featured a vast movement of people from the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the industrialized world of Europe and North America. Pakistanis, Indians, and West Indians moved to Great Britain; Algerians and West Africans to France; Turks and Kurds to Germany; Filipinos, Koreans, Cubans, Mexicans, and Haitians to the United States. A considerable majority of these people have been dubbed “labor migrants.” Most moved, often illegally and with few skills, to escape poverty in their own lands, drawn by an awareness of Western prosperity and a belief that a better future awaited them in the developed countries. By 2003, some 4 million Filipino domestic workers were employed in 130 countries. Young women by the hundreds of thousands from poor countries have been recruited as sex workers in wealthier nations, sometimes in conditions approaching slavery. Smaller numbers of highly skilled and university-trained people, such as doctors and computer scientists, came in search of professional opportunities less available in their own countries. All of this represented a kind of reverse “development aid”—either as cheap labor or intellectual resources—from poor countries to rich. Still other peoples moved as refugees, fleeing violence or political oppression in places such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Sudan, Uganda, Cuba, and Haiti.

Many of those people in motion were headed for the United States, drawn by its reputation for wealth and opportunity. In the forty years between 1971 and 2010, almost 20 million immigrants arrived in the United States legally, and millions more entered illegally, the vast majority of both from the Latin American/Caribbean region and from Asia. Mexicans have been by far the largest group of immigrants to the United States, and many have arrived without legal documentation, an estimated 6.65 million during the first decade of the twenty-first century alone. Often their journeys north have been dangerous as they confronted long treks through burning deserts, sought to evade American immigration authorities, and had to depend on expensive and sometimes unreliable “coyotes” who facilitate the smuggling of people

across the border. Once in the United States, many of these immigrants provided inexpensive manual labor in fields, factories, and homes of the well-to-do, even as the money they sent back to their families in Mexico represented that nation's largest source of foreign exchange. The presence of migrants from the Global South has prompted considerable cultural and political conflict in both the United States and Europe, illustrated by a prolonged controversy about the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls in French public schools.

Growth, Instability, and Inequality

The impact of these tightening economic links has prompted enormous debate and controversy. Amid the swirl of contending opinion, one thing seemed reasonably clear: economic globalization accompanied, and arguably helped generate, the most remarkable spurt of economic growth in world history. On a global level, total world output grew from a value of \$7 trillion in 1950 to \$73 trillion in 2009 and on a per capita basis from \$2,652 to \$10,728.³ This represents an immense, rapid, and unprecedented creation of wealth with a demonstrable impact on human welfare. Life expectancies expanded almost everywhere, infant mortality declined, and literacy increased. The UN Human Development Report in 1997 concluded that “in the past 50 years, poverty has fallen more than in the previous 500.”⁴

Far more problematic have been the instability of this emerging world economy and the distribution of the wealth it has generated. Amid overall economic growth, periodic crises and setbacks have shaped recent world history. Soaring oil prices contributed to a severe stock market crash in 1973–1974 and great hardship for many developing countries. Inability to repay mounting debts triggered a major financial crisis in Latin America during the 1980s and resulted in a “lost decade” in terms of economic development. Another financial crisis in Asia during the late 1990s resulted in the collapse of many businesses, widespread unemployment, and political upheaval in Indonesia and Thailand.

But nothing since the Great Depression more clearly illustrated the unsettling consequences of global connectedness in the absence of global regulation than the worldwide economic contraction that began in 2008. An inflated housing market—or “bubble”—in the United States collapsed, triggering millions of home foreclosures, growing unemployment, the tightening of credit, and declining consumer spending. Soon this crisis rippled around the world. Iceland's rapidly growing economy collapsed almost overnight as three major banks failed, the country's stock market dropped by 80 percent, and its currency lost more than 70 percent of its value—all in a single week. In Africa, reduced demand for exports threatened to halt a promising decade of economic progress. In Sierra Leone, for example, some 90 percent of the country's diamond-mine workers lost their jobs. The slowing of China's booming economy led to unemployment for one in seven of the country's urban migrants, forcing them to return to already overcrowded rural areas. Impoverished Central American and Caribbean families, dependent on money sent home by family members working

■ Connection

What new or sharper divisions has economic globalization generated?

abroad, suffered further as those remittances dropped sharply. Contracting economies contributed to debt crises in Greece, Italy, and Spain and threatened to unravel European economic integration. Calls for both protectionism and greater regulation suggested that the wide-open capitalist world economy of recent decades was perhaps not as inevitable as some had thought. Whatever the overall benefits of the modern global system, economic stability and steady progress were not among them.

Nor was equality. Since Europe's Industrial Revolution took hold in the early nineteenth century, a wholly new division appeared within the human community—between the rich industrialized countries, primarily in Europe and North America, and everyone else. In 1820, the ratio between the income of the top and bottom 20 percent of the world's population was three to one. By 1991, it was eighty-six to one.⁵ The accelerated economic globalization of the twentieth century did not create this global rift, but it arguably has worsened the North/South gap and certainly has not greatly diminished it. Even the well-known capitalist financier and investor George Soros, a billionaire many times over, acknowledged this reality in 2000: "The global capitalist system has produced a very uneven playing field. The gap between the rich and the poor is getting wider."⁶ That gap has been evident, often tragically, in great disparities in incomes, medical care, availability of clean drinking water, educational and employment opportunities, access to the Internet, and dozens of other ways. It has shaped the life chances of practically everyone (see Snapshot).

These disparities were the foundations for a new kind of global conflict. As the East/West division of capitalism and communism faded, differences between the rich nations of the Global North and the developing countries of the Global South assumed greater prominence in world affairs. Highly contentious issues have included the rules for world trade, availability of and terms for foreign aid, representation in international economic organizations, the mounting problem of indebtedness, and environmental and labor standards. Such matters surfaced repeatedly in international negotiations during the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. In the 1970s, for example, a large group of developing countries joined together to demand a "new international economic order" that was more favorable to the poor countries. Not much success attended this effort. More recently, developing countries have contested protectionist restrictions on their agricultural exports imposed by the rich countries seeking to protect their own politically powerful farmers.

Beyond active resistance by the rich nations, a further obstacle to reforming the world economy in favor of the poor lay in growing disparities among the developing countries themselves. The oil-rich economies of the Middle East had little in common with the banana-producing countries of Central America. The rapidly industrializing states of China, India, and South Korea had quite different economic agendas than impoverished African countries. These disparities made common action difficult to achieve.

Economic globalization has contributed to inequalities not only at the global level and among developing countries but also within individual nations, rich and poor

Snapshot Global Development and Inequality, 2011⁷

This table shows twelve commonly used indicators of “development” and their variations in 2011 across four major groups of countries defined by average level of per capita income. In which areas has the Global South most nearly caught up with the Global North?

Gross National Income per capita with sample countries	Low Income \$995 or less (Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Myanmar)	Lower Middle \$996–3945 (India, China, Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria)	Upper Middle \$3946–12,195 (Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Russia, Iran)	Upper \$12,196 or more (USA, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia)
Life Expectancy M/F in years	58/60	66/70	68/75	77/83
Deaths under age 5 per 1000 live births	120	60	24	7
Deaths from infectious disease: %	36	14	11	7
Access to toilets: %	35	50	84	99
Years of education	7.9	10.3	13.8	14.5
Literacy rate: %	66	80	93	99
Population growth: % annual	2.27	1.27	.96	.39
Urban population: %	27	41	74	78
Cell phones per 100 people	22	47	92	106
Internet users per 100 people	2.3	13.7	29.9	68.3
Personal computers per 100 people	1.2	4.3	11.9	60.4
Cars per 1,000 people	5.8	20.3	125.2	435.1
Carbon dioxide emissions: metric tons per capita	1	3	5	13

alike. In the United States, for example, a shifting global division of labor required the American economy to shed millions of manufacturing jobs. With recent U.S. factory wages far higher than those of China, many companies moved their manufacturing operations offshore to Asia or Latin America. This left many relatively unskilled American workers in the lurch, forcing them to work in the low-wage service sector, even as other Americans were growing prosperous in emerging high-tech industries. Even some highly skilled work, such as computer programming, was outsourced to lower-wage sites in India, Ireland, Russia, and elsewhere. By 2012, mounting income inequality and the erosion of the country's middle class had become major issues in American political debate.

Globalization divided Mexico as well. The northern part of the country, with close business and manufacturing ties to the United States, grew much more prosperous than the south, which was a largely rural agricultural area and had a far more slowly growing economy. Beginning in 1994, southern resentment boiled over in the Chiapas rebellion, which featured a strong anti-globalization platform. Its leader, known as Subcomandante Marcos, referred to globalization as a “process to eliminate that multitude of people who are not useful to the powerful.”⁸ (See Document 23.5, pp. 1180–81.) China's rapid economic growth likewise fostered mounting inequality between its rural households and those in its burgeoning cities, where income by 2000 was three times that of the countryside. Economic globalization may have brought people together as never before, but it also divided them sharply.

The hardships and grievances of those left behind or threatened by the march toward economic integration have fueled a growing popular movement aimed at criticizing and counteracting globalization. Known variously as an anti-globalization, alternative globalization, or global justice movement, it emerged in the 1990s as an international coalition of political activists, concerned scholars and students, trade unions, women's and religious organizations, environmental groups, and others, hailing from rich and poor countries alike. Thus opposition to neoliberal globalization was itself global in scope. Though reflecting a variety of viewpoints, that opposition largely agreed that free trade, market-driven corporate globalization had lowered labor standards, fostered ecological degradation, prevented poor countries from protecting themselves against financial speculators, ignored local cultures, disregarded human rights, and enhanced global inequality, while favoring the interests of large corporations and the rich countries.

This movement appeared dramatically on the world's radar screen in late 1999 in Seattle at a meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Visual Source 23.3, p. 1186). An international body representing 149 nations and charged with negotiating the rules for global commerce and promoting free trade, the WTO had become a major target of globalization critics. “The central idea of the WTO,” argued one such critic, “is that *free trade*—actually the values and interests of global corporations—should supersede all other values.”⁹ Tens of thousands of protesters—academics, activists, farmers, labor union leaders from all over the world—descended on Seattle in what became a violent, chaotic, and much-publicized protest. At the city's harbor,


protest organizers created a Seattle Tea Party around the slogan “No globalization without representation,” echoing the Boston Tea Party of 1773. Subsequent meetings of the WTO and other high-level international economic gatherings were likewise greeted with large-scale protest and a heavy police presence. In 2001, alternative globalization activists created the World Social Forum, an annual gathering to coordinate strategy, exchange ideas, and share experiences, under the slogan “Another world is possible.” It was an effort to demonstrate that neoliberal globalization was not inevitable and that the processes of a globalized economy could and should be regulated and subjected to public accountability.

Globalization and an American Empire

For many people, opposition to this kind of globalization also expressed resistance to mounting American power and influence in the world. An “American Empire,” some have argued, is the face of globalization (see Map 23.2), but scholars, commentators, and politicians have disagreed about how best to describe the United States’ role in the postwar world. Certainly it has not been a colonial territorial empire such as that of the British or the French in the nineteenth century. Americans generally, seeking to distinguish themselves from Europeans, have vigorously denied that they have an empire at all.

In some ways, the U.S. global presence might be seen as an “informal empire,” similar to the ones that Europeans exercised in China and the Middle East during the nineteenth century. In both cases, economic penetration, political pressure, and periodic military action sought to create societies and governments compatible with the values and interests of the dominant power, but without directly governing large populations for long periods. In its economic dimension, American dominance has been termed an “empire of production,” which uses its immense wealth to entice or intimidate potential collaborators.¹⁰ Some scholars have emphasized the United States’ frequent use of force around the world, while others have focused attention on the “soft power” of its cultural attractiveness, its political and cultural freedoms, the economic benefits of cooperation, and the general willingness of many to follow the American lead voluntarily.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war by the early 1990s, U.S. military dominance was unchecked by any equivalent power. When the United States was attacked by Islamic militants on September 11, 2001, that power was unleashed first against Afghanistan (2001), which had sheltered the al-Qaeda instigators of that attack, and then against Iraq (2003), where Saddam Hussein allegedly had been developing weapons of mass destruction. In the absence of the Soviet Union, the United States could act unilaterally without fear of triggering a conflict with another major power. Although the Afghan and Iraqi regimes were quickly defeated, establishing a lasting peace and rebuilding badly damaged Muslim countries have proved difficult tasks. Thus, within a decade of the Soviet collapse, the United States found itself in yet another global struggle, an effort to contain or eliminate Islamic “terrorism.”



Map 23.2 Two Faces of an “American Empire”

Those who argue that the United States constructed an empire in the second half of the twentieth century point both to its political/military alliances and interventions around the world and to U.S. economic and cultural penetration of many countries. The distribution of U.S. military bases, a partial indication of its open and covert interventions, and the location of McDonald's restaurants indicates something of the scope of America's global presence in the early twenty-first century.

Since the 1980s, as its relative military strength peaked, the United States faced growing international economic competition. The recovery of Europe and Japan and the emergent industrialization of South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India substantially reduced the United States' share of overall world production from about 50 percent in 1945 to 20 percent in the 1980s. By 2008 the United States accounted for just 8.1 percent of world merchandise exports. Accompanying this relative decline was a sharp reversal of the country's trade balance as U.S. imports greatly exceeded its exports. China was on track to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy by the 2020s even as it held much of the mounting American national debt.

However it might be defined, the exercise of American power, like that of many empires, was resisted abroad and contested at home. In Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, armed struggle against U.S. intervention was both costly and painful. During the cold war, the governments of India, Egypt, and Ethiopia sought to diminish American influence in their affairs by turning to the Soviet Union or playing off the two superpowers against each other. Even France, resenting U.S. domination, withdrew from the military structure of NATO in 1967 and expelled all foreign-controlled troops from the country. Many intellectuals, fearing the erosion of their own cultures in the face of well-financed American media around the world, have decried American "cultural imperialism." By the early twenty-first century, the United States' international policies—such as its refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; its refusal to ratify the Kyoto protocol on global warming; its doctrine of preemptive war, which was exercised in Iraq; and its apparent use of torture—had generated widespread opposition.

Within the United States as well, the global exercise of American power generated controversy. The Vietnam War, for example, divided the United States more sharply than at any time since the Civil War. It split families and friendships, churches and political parties. The war provided a platform for a growing number of critics, both at home and abroad, who had come to resent American cultural and economic dominance in the post-1945 world. It stimulated a new sense of activism among students in the nation's colleges and universities. Many of them came to see America itself as an imperialist power. A similar set of issues, protests, and controversies followed the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The Globalization of Liberation: Focus on Feminism

More than goods, money, and people traversed the planet during the most recent century. So too did ideas, and none was more powerful than that of liberation. Communism promised workers and peasants liberation from capitalist oppression. Nationalism offered subject peoples liberation from imperialism. Advocates of democracy sought liberation from authoritarian governments.

The 1960s in particular witnessed an unusual convergence of protest movements around the world, suggesting the emergence of a global culture of liberation. Within the United States, the civil rights demands of African Americans and Hispanic Americans; the youthful counterculture of rock music, sex, and drugs; the prolonged and

highly divisive protests against the war in Vietnam—all of this gave the 1960s a distinctive place in the country's recent history. Across the Atlantic, swelling protests against unresponsive bureaucracy, consumerism, and middle-class values likewise erupted, most notably in France in 1968. There a student-led movement protesting conditions in universities attracted the support of many middle-class people, who were horrified at the brutality of the police, and stimulated an enormous strike among some 9 million workers. France seemed on the edge of another revolution. Related but smaller-scale movements took place in Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Argentina, and elsewhere.

The communist world too was rocked by protest. In 1968, a new Communist Party leadership in Czechoslovakia, led by Alexander Dubcek, initiated a sweeping series of reforms aimed at creating “socialism with a human face.” Censorship ended, generating an explosion of free expression in what had been a highly repressive regime; unofficial political clubs emerged publicly; victims of earlier repression were rehabilitated; secret ballots for party elections were put in place. To the conservative leaders of the Soviet Union, this “Prague Spring” seemed to challenge communist rule itself, and they sent troops and tanks to crush it. Across the world in communist China, another kind of protest was taking shape in that country's Cultural Revolution (see Chapter 21, p. 1051).

In the developing countries, a substantial number of political leaders, activists, scholars, and students developed the notion of a “third world.” Their countries, many only recently free from colonial rule, would offer an alternative to both a decrepit Western capitalism and a repressive Soviet communism. They claimed to pioneer new forms of economic development, of grassroots democracy, and of cultural renewal. By the late 1960s, the icon of this third-world ideology was Che Guevara, the Argentine-born revolutionary who had embraced the Cuban revolution and subsequently attempted to replicate its experience of liberation through guerrilla warfare in parts of Africa and Latin America. Various aspects of his life story—his fervent anti-imperialism, cast as a global struggle; his self-sacrificing lifestyle; his death in

1967 at the hands of the Bolivian military, trained and backed by the American CIA—made him a heroic figure to third world revolutionaries. He was popular as well among Western radicals, who were disgusted with the complacency and materialism of their own societies.

No expression of this global culture of liberation held a more profound potential for change than feminism, for it represented a rethinking of the most fundamental and personal of all human relationships—that between women and men. Feminism had begun in the West in the nineteenth century with a primary focus on suffrage and in several countries had achieved the status of a mass movement by the outbreak of World War I (see

Che Guevara

In life, Che was an uncompromising but failed revolutionary, while in death he became an inspiration to third-world liberation movements and a symbol of radicalism to many in the West. His image appeared widely on T-shirts and posters, and in Cuba itself a government-sponsored cult featured schoolchildren chanting each morning “We will be like Che.” This billboard image of Che was erected in Havana in 1988. (© Tim Page/Corbis)



pp. 805–10). The twentieth century, however, witnessed the globalization of feminism as organized efforts to address the concerns of women took shape across the world. Communist governments—in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, for example—mounted vigorous efforts to gain the support of women and to bring them into the workforce by attacking major elements of older patriarchies (see pp. 1046–47 and Document 23.1, pp. 1173–75). But feminism took hold in many cultural and political settings, where women confronted different issues, adopted different strategies, and experienced a range of outcomes.

Feminism in the West

In the West, organized feminism had lost momentum by the end of the 1920s, when most countries had achieved universal suffrage. When it revived in the 1960s in both Western Europe and the United States, it did so with a quite different agenda. In France, for example, the writer and philosopher Simone de Beauvoir in 1949 had published *The Second Sex*, a book arguing that women had historically been defined as “other,” or deviant from the “normal” male sex. The book soon became a central statement of a reviving women’s movement. French feminists staged a counter–Mother’s Day parade under the slogan “Celebrated one day; exploited all year.” To highlight their demand to control their own bodies, some 343 women signed a published manifesto stating that they had undergone an abortion, which was then illegal in France.

Across the Atlantic, millions of American women responded to Betty Friedan’s book *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), which disclosed the identity crisis of educated women, unfulfilled by marriage and motherhood. Some adherents of this second-wave feminism took up the equal rights agenda of their nineteenth-century predecessors, but with an emphasis now on employment and education rather than voting rights. A more radical expression of American feminism, widely known as “women’s liberation,” took broader aim at patriarchy as a system of domination, similar to those of race and class. (See Document 23.2, pp. 1175–76.) One manifesto from 1969 declared:

We are exploited as sex objects, breeders, domestic servants, and cheap labor. We are considered inferior beings, whose only purpose is to enhance men’s lives. . . . Because we live so intimately with our oppressors, we have been kept from seeing our personal suffering as a political condition.¹¹

Thus liberation for women meant becoming aware of their own oppression, a process that took place in thousands of consciousness-raising groups across the country. Many such women preferred direct action rather than the political lobbying favored by equal rights feminists. They challenged the Miss America contest of 1968 by tossing stink bombs in the hall, crowning a live sheep as their Miss America, and disposing of girdles, bras, high-heeled shoes, tweezers, and other “instruments of oppression” in a Freedom Trashcan. They also brought into open discussion issues involving sexuality, insisting that free love, lesbianism, and celibacy should be accorded the same respect as heterosexual marriage.

■ Comparison

What distinguished feminism in the industrialized countries from that in the Global South?

Yet another strand of Western feminism emerged from women of color. For many of them, the concerns of white, usually middle-class, feminists were hardly relevant to their oppression. Black women had always worked outside the home and so felt little need to be liberated from the chains of homemaking. Whereas white women might find the family oppressive, African American women viewed it as a secure base from which to resist racism. Solidarity with black men, rather than separation from them, was essential in confronting a racist America. Viewing mainstream feminism as “a family quarrel between White women and White men,” many women of African descent in the United States and Britain established their own organizations, with a focus on racism and poverty.¹² (See Document 23.3, pp. 1176–78.)

Feminism in the Global South

As women mobilized outside of the Western world during the twentieth century, they faced very different situations than did white women in the United States and Europe. For much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the predominant issues—colonialism, racism, the struggle for independence, poverty, development, political oppression, and sometimes revolution—were not directly related to gender. (See Document 23.5, pp. 1180–81.) Women were affected by and engaged with all of these efforts and were welcomed by nationalist and communist leaders, mostly men, who needed their support. But once independence or the revolution was achieved, the women who had joined those movements often were relegated to marginal positions.

The different conditions within developing countries sometimes generated sharp criticism of Western feminism. To many African feminists in the 1970s and beyond, the concerns of their American or European sisters were too individualistic, too focused on sexuality, and insufficiently concerned with issues of motherhood, marriage, and poverty to be of much use. Furthermore, they resented Western feminists’ insistent interest in cultural matters such as female genital mutilation and polygamy, which sometimes echoed the concerns of colonial-era missionaries and administrators. Western feminism could easily be seen as a new form of cultural imperialism. Moreover, many African governments and many African men defined feminism of any kind as “un-African” and associated with a hated colonialism.

Women’s movements in the Global South took shape around a wide range of issues, not all of which were explicitly gender based. In the East African country of Kenya, a major form of mobilization was the women’s group movement. Some 27,000 small associations of women, an outgrowth of traditional self-help groups, had a combined membership of more than a million by the late 1980s. They provided support for one another during times of need, such as weddings, births, and funerals; they took on community projects, such as building water cisterns, schools, and dispensaries; in one province, they focused on providing permanent iron roofing for their homes. Some became revolving loan societies or bought land or businesses. One woman testified to the sense of empowerment she derived from membership in her group:

I am a free woman. I bought this piece of land through my group. I can lie on it, work on it, keep goats or cows. What more do I want? My husband cannot sell it. It is mine.¹³

Elsewhere, other issues and approaches predominated. In the North African Islamic kingdom of Morocco, a more centrally directed and nationally focused feminist movement targeted the country's Family Law Code, which still defined women as minors. In 2004, a long campaign by Morocco's feminist movement, often with the help of supportive men and a liberal king, resulted in a new Family Law Code, which recognized women as equals to their husbands and allowed them to initiate divorce and to claim child custody, all of which had previously been denied. (See Document 23.4, pp. 1178–79, for an Islamic-based feminist argument.)

In Chile, a women's movement emerged as part of a national struggle against the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, who ruled the country from 1973 to 1990. Because they were largely regarded as "invisible" in the public sphere, women were able to organize extensively, despite the repression of the Pinochet regime. From this explosion of organizing activity emerged a women's movement that crossed class lines and party affiliations. Human rights activists, most of them women, called attention to the widespread use of torture and to the "disappearance" of thousands of opponents of the regime, while demanding the restoration of democracy. Poor urban women by the tens of thousands organized soup kitchens, craft workshops, and shopping collectives, all aimed at the economic survival of their families. Smaller numbers of middle-class women brought more distinctly feminist perspectives to the movement and argued pointedly for "democracy in the country and in the home." This diverse women's movement was an important part of the larger national protest that returned Chile to democratic government in 1990.

International Feminism

Perhaps the most impressive achievement of feminism in the twentieth century was its ability to project the "woman question" as a global issue and to gain international recognition for the view that "women's rights are human rights."¹⁴ Like slavery and empire before it, patriarchy lost at least some of its legitimacy during this most recent century, although clearly it has not been vanquished.

Feminism registered as a global issue when the United Nations (UN), under pressure from women activists, declared 1975 as International Women's Year and the next ten years as the Decade for Women. The UN also sponsored a series of World Conferences on Women over the next twenty years. By 2006, 183 nations, though not the United States, had ratified a UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which committed them to promote women's legal equality, to end discrimination, to actively encourage women's development, and to protect women's human rights. Clearly this international attention to women's



An Aspect of Brazilian Feminism

Protesting macho culture and violence against women, this demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil in mid-2011 sought to counter the assumption that female victims of rape were responsible for those attacks because of how they dressed. And so they marched as “sluts,” wearing sexually provocative clothing, while urging the “transformation of the world by feminism.” The yellow sign declares: “It’s my body.” (Australfoto)

issues was encouraging to feminists operating in their own countries and in many places stimulated both research and action.

This growing international spotlight on women’s issues also revealed sharp divisions within global feminism. One issue was determining who had the right to speak on behalf of women at international gatherings—the official delegates of male-dominated governments or the often more radical unofficial participants representing various nongovernmental organizations. North/South conflicts also surfaced at these international conferences. In preparing for the Mexico City gathering in 1975, the United States attempted to limit the agenda to matters of political and civil rights for women, whereas delegates from third world and communist countries wanted to include issues of economic justice, decolonization, and disarmament. Feminists from the South resented the dominance and contested the ideas of their Northern sisters. One African group highlighted the differences:

While patriarchal views and structures oppress women all over the world, women are also members of classes and countries that dominate others and enjoy privileges in terms of access to resources. Hence, contrary to the best intentions of “sisterhood,” not all women share identical interests.¹⁵

Nor did all third world groups have identical views. Some Muslim delegates at the Beijing Conference in 1995 opposed a call for equal inheritance for women because Islamic law required that sons receive twice the amount that daughters inherit. In contrast, Africans, especially in non-Muslim countries, were aware of how many children had been orphaned by AIDS and felt that girls’ chances for survival depended on equal inheritance.

Finally, beyond such divisions within international feminism lay a global backlash among those who felt that its radical agenda had undermined family life, the proper relationship of men and women, and civilization generally. To Phyllis Schlafly, a prominent American opponent of the Equal Rights Amendment, feminism was a

“disease” that brought in its wake “fear, sickness, pain, anger, hatred, danger, violence, and all manner of ugliness.”¹⁶ In the Islamic world, Western-style feminism, with its claims of gender equality and open sexuality, was highly offensive to many and fueled movements of religious revivalism that invited or compelled women to wear the veil and sometimes to lead highly restricted lives. The Vatican, some Catholic and Muslim countries, and at times the U.S. government took strong exception to aspects of global feminism, particularly its emphasis on reproductive rights, including access to abortion and birth control. Thus feminism was global as the twenty-first century dawned, but it was very diverse and much contested.

Religion and Global Modernity

Beyond liberation and feminism, a further dimension of cultural globalization took shape in the challenge that modernity presented to the world's religions. To the most “advanced” thinkers of the past several hundred years—Enlightenment writers in the eighteenth century, Karl Marx in the nineteenth, many academics and secular-minded intellectuals in the twentieth—religion was headed for extinction in the face of modernity, science, communism, or globalization. In some places—Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union, for example—religious belief and practice had declined sharply. Moreover, the spread of a scientific culture around the world persuaded small minorities everywhere, often among the most highly educated, that the only realities worth considering were those that could be measured with the techniques of science. To such people, all else was superstition, born of ignorance. Nevertheless, the far more prominent trends of the last century have been those that involved the further spread of major world religions, their resurgence in new forms, their opposition to elements of a secular and global modernity, and their political role as a source of community identity and conflict. Contrary to earlier expectations, religion has played an unexpectedly powerful role in this most recent century.

Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam had long functioned as transregional cultures, spreading far beyond their places of origin. That process continued in the twentieth century. Buddhist ideas and practices such as meditation found a warm reception in the West, as did yoga, originally a mind-body practice of Indian origin. Christianity of various kinds spread widely in non-Muslim Africa and South Korea and less extensively in parts of India. By the end of the twentieth century, it was growing even in China, where perhaps 7 to 8 percent of China's population—some 84 to 96 million people—claimed allegiance to the faith. No longer a primarily European or North American religion, Christianity by the early twenty-first century found some 62 percent of its adherents in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In some instances missionaries from those regions have set about the “re-evangelization” of Europe and North America. Moreover, millions of migrants from the Islamic world planted their religion solidly in the West. In the United States, for example, a substantial number of African Americans and smaller numbers of European Americans engaged in Islamic practice. For several decades the writings of the thirteenth-century Islamic

Sufi poet Rumi have been bestsellers in the United States. Religious exchange, in short, has been a two-way street, not simply a transmission of Western ideas to the rest of the world. More than ever before, religious pluralism characterized many of the world's societies, confronting people with the need to make choices in a domain of life previously regarded as given and fixed.

Fundamentalism on a Global Scale

■ **Change**

In what respect did the various religious fundamentalisms of the twentieth century express hostility to global modernity?

Religious vitality in the twentieth century was expressed not only in the spread of particular traditions to new areas but also in the vigorous response of those traditions to the modernizing and globalizing world in which they found themselves. One such response has been widely called “fundamentalism,” a militant piety—defensive, assertive, and exclusive—that took shape to some extent in every major religious tradition. Many features of the modern world, after all, appeared threatening to established religion. The scientific and secular focus of global modernity challenged the core beliefs of religion, with its focus on an unseen realm of reality. Furthermore, the social upheavals connected with capitalism, industrialization, and globalization thoroughly upset customary class, family, and gender relationships that had long been sanctified by religious tradition. Nation-states, often associated with particular religions, were likewise undermined by the operation of a global economy and challenged by the spread of alien cultures. In much of the world, these disruptions came at the hands of foreigners, usually Westerners, in the form of military defeat, colonial rule, economic dependency, and cultural intrusion.

To such threats, fundamentalism represented a religious response, characterized by one scholar as “embattled forms of spirituality . . . experienced as a cosmic war between the forces of good and evil.”¹⁷ Although fundamentalisms everywhere have looked to the past for ideals and models, their rejection of modernity was selective, not wholesale. What they sought was an alternative modernity, infused with particular religious values. Most, in fact, made active use of modern technology to communicate their message and certainly sought the potential prosperity associated with modern life. Extensive educational and propaganda efforts, political mobilization of their followers, social welfare programs, and sometimes violence (“terrorism” to their opponents) were among the means that fundamentalists employed.

The term “fundamentalism” derived from the United States, where religious conservatives in the early twentieth century were outraged by critical and “scientific” approaches to the Bible, by Darwinian evolution, and by liberal versions of Christianity that accommodated these heresies. They called for a return to the “fundamentals” of the faith, which included the literal truthfulness of the scriptures, the virgin birth and physical resurrection of Jesus, and a belief in miracles. After World War II, American Protestant fundamentalism came to oppose political liberalism and “big government,” the sexual revolution of the 1960s, homosexuality and abortion rights, and secular humanism generally. Many fundamentalists saw the United States on the

edge of an abyss. For one major spokesman, Francis Schaeffer (1912–1984), the West was about to enter

an electronic dark age, in which the new pagan hordes, with all the power of technology at their command, are on the verge of obliterating the last strongholds of civilized humanity. A vision of darkness lies before us. As we leave the shores of Christian Western man behind, only a dark and turbulent sea of despair stretches endlessly ahead . . . unless we fight.¹⁸

And fight they did! At first, fundamentalists sought to separate themselves from the secular world in their own churches and schools, but from the 1970s on, they entered the political arena as the “religious right,” determined to return America to a “godly path.” “We have enough votes to run this country,” declared Pat Robertson, a major fundamentalist evangelist and broadcaster who ran for president in 1988. Conservative Christians, no longer willing to restrict their attention to personal salvation, had emerged as a significant force in American political life well before the end of the century.

In the very different setting of independent India, another fundamentalist movement—known as Hindutva (Hindu nationalism)—took shape during the 1980s. Like American fundamentalism, it represented a politicization of religion within a democratic context. To its advocates, India was, and always had been, an essentially Hindu land, even though it had been overwhelmed in recent centuries by Muslim invaders, then by the Christian British, and most recently by the secular state of the post-independence decades. The leaders of modern India, they argued, and particularly its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, were “the self-proclaimed secularists who . . . seek to remake India in the Western image,” while repudiating its basically Hindu religious character. The Hindutva movement took political shape in an increasingly popular party called the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with much of its support coming from urban middle-class or upper-caste people who resented the state’s efforts to cater to the interests of Muslims, Sikhs, and the lower castes. Muslims in particular were defined as outsiders, potentially more loyal to a Muslim Pakistan than to India. The BJP became a major political force in India during the 1980s and 1990s, winning a number of elections at both the state and national levels and promoting a distinctly Hindu identity in education, culture, and religion.

Creating Islamic Societies: Resistance and Renewal in the World of Islam

The most prominent of the late twentieth-century fundamentalisms was surely that of Islam. Expressed in many and various ways, it was an effort among growing numbers of Muslims to renew and reform the practice of Islam and to create a new religious/political order centered on a particular understanding of their faith. Earlier renewal movements, such as the eighteenth-century Wahhabis (see pp. 736–37), focused

■ **Change**

From what sources did Islamic renewal movements derive?

largely on the internal problems of Muslim societies, while those of the twentieth century responded as well to the external pressures of colonial rule, Western imperialism, and secular modernity.

Emerging strongly in the last quarter of the century, Islamic renewal movements gained strength from the enormous disappointments that had accumulated in the Muslim world by the 1970s. Conquest and colonial rule; awareness of the huge technological and economic gap between Islamic and European civilizations; the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, long the chief Islamic state; elite enchantment with Western culture; the retreat of Islam for many to the realm of private life—all of this had sapped the cultural self-confidence of many Muslims by the mid-twentieth century. Political independence for former colonies certainly represented a victory for Islamic societies, but it had given rise to major states—Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Algeria, and others—that pursued essentially Western and secular policies of nationalism, socialism, and economic development, often with only lip service to an Islamic identity.

Even worse, these policies were not very successful. A number of endemic problems—vastly overcrowded cities with few services, widespread unemployment, pervasive corruption, slow economic growth, a mounting gap between the rich and poor—flew in the face of the great expectations that had accompanied the struggle against European domination. Despite formal independence, foreign intrusion still persisted. Israel, widely regarded as an outpost of the West, had been reestablished as a Jewish state in the very center of the Islamic world in 1948. In 1967, Israel inflicted a devastating defeat on Arab forces in the Six-Day War and seized various Arab territories, including the holy city of Jerusalem. Furthermore, broader signs of Western cultural penetration persisted—secular schools, alcohol, Barbie dolls, European and American movies, scantily clad women. The largely secular leader of independent Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, argued against the veil for women as well as polygamy for men and discouraged his people from fasting during Ramadan. In 1960 he was shown on television drinking orange juice during the sacred month to the outrage of many traditional Muslims.

This was the context in which the idea of an Islamic alternative to Western models of modernity began to take hold. The intellectual and political foundations of this Islamic renewal had been established earlier in the century. Its leading figures, such as the Indian Mawlana Mawdudi and the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, insisted that the Quran and the *sharia* (Islamic law) provided a guide for all of life—political, economic, and spiritual—and a blueprint for a distinctly Islamic modernity not dependent on Western ideas. It was the departure from Islamic principles, they argued, that had led the Islamic world into decline and subordination to the West, and only a return to the “straight path of Islam” would ensure a revival of Muslim societies. That effort to return to Islamic principles was labeled *jihad*, an ancient and evocative religious term that refers to “struggle” or “striving” to please God. In its twentieth-century political expression, *jihad* included the defense of an authentic Islam against Western aggression and vigorous efforts to achieve the Islamization of social and political life within

Muslim countries. It was a posture that would enable Muslims to resist the seductive but poisonous culture of the West. Sayyid Qutb had witnessed that culture during a visit to the United States in the late 1940s and was appalled by what he saw:

Look at this capitalism with its monopolies, its usury . . . at this individual freedom, devoid of human sympathy and responsibility for relatives except under force of law; at this materialistic attitude which deadens the spirit; at this behavior like animals which you call “free mixing of the sexes”; at this vulgarity which you call “emancipation of women”; at this evil and fanatical racial discrimination.¹⁹

The earliest mass movement to espouse such ideas was Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by an impoverished schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949). Advocating “government that will act in conformity to the law and Islamic principles,” the Brotherhood soon attracted a substantial following, including many poor urban residents recently arrived from the countryside. Still a major presence in Egyptian political life, the Brotherhood has frequently come into conflict with state authorities.


By the 1970s, such ideas and organizations echoed widely across the Islamic world and found expression in many ways. At the level of personal life, many people became more religiously observant, attending mosque, praying regularly, and fasting. Substantial numbers of women, many of them young, urban, and well educated, adopted modest Islamic dress and the veil quite voluntarily. Participation in Sufi mystical practices increased in some places. Furthermore, many governments sought to anchor themselves in Islamic rhetoric and practice. During the 1970s, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt claimed the title of “Believer-President,” referred frequently to the Quran, and proudly displayed his “prayer mark,” a callus on his forehead caused by touching his head to the ground in prayer. Under pressure from Islamic activists, the government of Sudan in the 1980s adopted Quranic punishments for various crimes (such as amputating the hand of a thief) and announced a total ban on alcohol, dramatically dumping thousands of bottles of beer and wine into the Nile.

All over the Muslim world, from North Africa to Indonesia (see Map 23.3, p. 1160), Islamic renewal movements spawned organizations that operated legally to provide social services—schools, clinics, youth centers, legal-aid societies, financial institutions, publishing houses—that the state offered inadequately or not at all. Islamic activists took leadership roles in unions and professional organizations of teachers, journalists, engineers, doctors, and lawyers. Such people embraced modern science and technology but sought to embed these elements of modernity within a distinctly Islamic culture. Some served in official government positions or entered political life and contested elections where it was possible to do so. The Algerian Islamic Salvation Front was poised to win elections in 1992, when a frightened military government intervened to cancel the elections, an action that plunged the country into a decade of bitter civil war.

Another face of religious renewal, however, sought the overthrow of what they saw as compromised regimes in the Islamic world, most successfully in Iran in 1979

■ Comparison

In what different ways did Islamic renewal express itself?



Map 23.3 The Islamic World in the Early Twenty-first Century

An Islamic world of well over a billion people incorporated much of the Afro-Asian land-mass but was divided among many nations and along linguistic and ethnic lines as well. The long-term split between the majority Sunnis and the minority Shias also sharpened in the new millennium.

(see pp. 1115–17), but also in Afghanistan (1996) and parts of northern Nigeria (2000). Here Islamic movements succeeded in coming to power and began to implement a program of Islamization based on the sharia. Elsewhere military governments in Pakistan and Sudan likewise introduced elements of sharia-based law. Hoping to spark an Islamic revolution, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization assassinated President Sadat in 1981, following Sadat's brutal crackdown on both Islamic and secular opposition groups. One of the leaders of Islamic Jihad explained:

We have to establish the Rule of God's Religion in our own country first, and to make the Word of God supreme. . . . There is no doubt that the first battlefield for jihad is the extermination of these infidel leaders and to replace them by a complete Islamic Order.²⁰

Islamic revolutionaries also took aim at hostile foreign powers. Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, supported by the Islamic regime in Iran, targeted Israel with popular uprisings, suicide bombings, and rocket attacks in response to the Israeli occupation of Arab lands. For some, Israel's very existence was illegitimate. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted widespread opposition aimed at lib-



Hamas in Action

The Palestinian militant organization Hamas, founded in 1987 as an offshoot of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, illustrates two dimensions of Islamic radicalism. On the one hand, Hamas repeatedly sent suicide bombers to target Israeli civilians and sought the elimination of the Israeli state. A group of would-be suicide bombers are shown here in white robes during the funeral of colleagues killed by Israeli security forces in late 2003. On the other hand, Hamas ran a network of social services, providing schools, clinics, orphanages, summer camps, soup kitchens, and libraries for Palestinians. The classroom pictured here was part of a school founded by Hamas. (© Andrea Comas/Reuters/Corbis)

erating that country from atheistic communism and creating an Islamic state. Sympathetic Arabs from the Middle East flocked to the aid of their Afghan compatriots.

Among them was the young Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arab, who created an organization, al-Qaeda (meaning “the base” in Arabic), to funnel fighters and funds to the Afghan resistance. At the time, bin Laden and the Americans were on the same side, both opposing Soviet expansion into Afghanistan, but they soon parted ways. Returning to his home in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden became disillusioned and radicalized when the government of his country allowed the stationing of “infidel” U.S. troops in Islam’s holy land during and after the first American war against Iraq in 1991. By the mid-1990s, he had found a safe haven in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, from which he and other leaders of al-Qaeda planned their attack on the World Trade Center and other targets in the United States on September 11, 2001. Although they had no standing as Muslim clerics, in 1998 they had issued a *fatwa* (religious edict) declaring war on America:

[F]or over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. . . . [T]he ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem

and the holy mosque (in Mecca) from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.²¹

Elsewhere as well—in East Africa, Indonesia, Great Britain, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—al-Qaeda or groups associated with it launched scattered attacks on Western interests. At the international level, the great enemy was not Christianity itself or even Western civilization, but irreligious Western-style modernity, U.S. imperialism, and an American-led economic globalization so aptly symbolized by the World Trade Center. Ironically, al-Qaeda itself was a modern and global organization, many of whose members were highly educated professionals from a variety of countries.

Despite this focus on the West, the violent struggles undertaken by politicized Islamic activists were as much within the Islamic world as they were with the external enemy. Their understanding of Islam, heavily influenced by Wahhabi ideas, was in various ways quite novel and at odds with classical Islamic practice. It was highly literal and dogmatic in its understanding of the Quran, legalistic in its effort to regulate the minute details of daily life, deeply opposed to any “innovation” in religious practice, inclined to define those who disagreed with them as “non-Muslims,” and drawn to violent jihad as a legitimate part of Islamic life. It was also deeply skeptical about the interior spiritual emphasis of Sufism, which had informed so much of earlier Islamic culture. The spread of this version of Islam, often known as Salafism, owed much to massive financial backing from oil-rich Saudi Arabia, which funded Wahhabi/Salafi mosques and schools across the Islamic world and in the West as well.

Religious Alternatives to Fundamentalism

Militant revolutionary fundamentalism has certainly not been the only religious response to modernity and globalization within the Islamic world. Many who shared a concern to embed Islamic values more centrally in their societies have acted peacefully and within established political structures. In Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, and Lebanon, Islamic parties with various agendas made impressive electoral showings in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century. Considerable debate among Muslims has raised questions about the proper role of the state, the difference between the eternal law of God (sharia) and the human interpretations of it, the rights of women, the possibility of democracy, and many other issues. (See Document 22.3, pp. 1124–26, and Document 23.4, pp. 1178–79.) Some Muslim intellectuals and political leaders have called for a dialogue between civilizations; others have argued that traditions can change in the face of modern realities without losing their distinctive Islamic character. In 1996, Anwar Ibrahim, a major political and intellectual figure in Malaysia, insisted that

[Southeast Asian Muslims] would rather strive to improve the welfare of the women and children in their midst than spend their days elaborately defining the nature and institutions of the ideal Islamic state. They do not believe it makes one less of a Muslim to promote economic growth, to master the information revolution, and to demand justice for women.²²

In Turkey, a movement inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish Muslim scholar and preacher, has sought to apply the principles of Islamic spirituality and Sufi piety to the problems of modern society. Gaining a mass following in the 1990s and after, the Gulen movement has advocated interfaith and cross-cultural dialogue, multiparty democracy, nonviolence, and modern scientifically based education for girls and boys alike. Operating through schools, universities, conferences, newspapers, radio and TV stations, and various charities, it has a presence in more than 100 countries around the world. Claiming to be “faith-based but not faith limited,” the movement rejects the “fundamentalist” label even as it has challenged a wholly secular outlook on public life. And in 2004–2005, a gathering in Jordan of scholars from all major schools of Islamic thought issued the “Amman Message,” which called for Islamic unity, condemned terrorism, forbade Muslims from declaring one another as “apostate” or nonbelievers, and emphasized the commonalities shared by Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

Within other religious traditions as well, believers found various ways of responding to global modernity. More liberal or mainstream Christian groups spoke to the ethical issues arising from economic globalization. Many Christian organizations, for example, were active in agitating for debt relief for poor countries. Pope John Paul II was openly concerned about “the growing distance between rich and poor, unfair competition which puts the poor nations in a situation of ever-increasing inferiority.” “Liberation theology,” particularly in Latin America, sought a Christian basis for action in the areas of social justice, poverty, and human rights, while viewing Jesus as liberator as well as savior. In Asia, a growing movement known as “socially engaged Buddhism” addressed the needs of the poor through social reform, educational programs, health services, and peacemaking action during times of conflict and war. The Dalai Lama has famously advocated a peaceful resolution of Tibet’s troubled relationship with China. Growing interest in communication and exchange among the world’s religions was expressed in a UN resolution designating the first week of February 2011 as World Interfaith Harmony Week. In short, religious responses to global modernity were articulated in many voices.

SUMMING UP SO FAR

How might you compare feminism and fundamentalism as global movements? In what ways did they challenge earlier values and expectations? To what extent were they in conflict with one another?

Experiencing the Anthropocene Era: Environment and Environmentalism

Even as world religions, fundamentalist and otherwise, challenged global modernity on cultural or spiritual grounds, burgeoning environmental movements in the 1960s and after also did so with an eye to the human impact on the earth and its many living creatures, including ourselves. Among the distinctive features of the twentieth century, none has been more pronounced than humankind’s growing ability to alter the natural order and the mounting awareness of this phenomenon. When the wars, revolutions, and empires of this most recent century have faded from memory, environmental transformation and environmental consciousness may well seem to future generations the decisive feature of that century. Already, many scientists have begun

to refer to the current era, since at least the advent of the Industrial Revolution, as the Anthropocene or the Age of Man. That informal term has called attention to the lasting impact of human activity on the planet, even measured on a geological scale.²³

The Global Environment Transformed


■ Change

How can we explain the dramatic increase in the human impact on the environment in the twentieth century?

Underlying the environmental changes of the twentieth century were three factors that vastly magnified the human impact on earth's ecological systems far beyond anything previously known.²⁴ One was the explosion of human numbers, an unprecedented quadrupling of the world's population in a single century, leaving the world of 2012 with over 7 billion people compared to about 1.6 billion in 1900. It was a demographic revolution born of medical and sanitation advances that dramatically lowered death rates and Green Revolution technologies such as genetically modified seeds and fertilizers that substantially increased world food supplies. A second cause of environmental stress lay in the amazing new ability of humankind to tap the energy potential of fossil fuels—coal in the nineteenth century and oil in the twentieth. Hydroelectricity, natural gas, and nuclear power added to the energy resources available to our species. These new sources of energy made possible a third contribution to environmental transformation—phenomenal economic growth—as modern science and technology immensely increased the production of goods and services. Between the 1890s and the 1990s, global industrial output grew by a factor of 40, although very unevenly across the planet. An average North American in the 1990s, for example, used 50 to 100 times more energy than an average Bangladeshi (see Map 23.4). But almost everywhere—in capitalist, communist, and developing countries alike—the idea of economic growth or “development” as something possible and desirable took hold as a novel element of global culture.

These three factors were the foundations for the immense environmental transformations of the twentieth century. Human activity had always altered the natural order, usually on a local basis, but now the scale of that impact assumed global and perhaps even geological proportions. The growing numbers of the poor and the growing consumption of the rich led to the doubling of cropland, a corresponding contraction of the world's forests and grasslands, and dramatic increases in the rate of erosion. Huge urban complexes have transformed the landscape in many places. With diminished habitats, numerous species of plants and animals either disappeared or were threatened with extinction at a rate many times greater than the background level. Certainly massive species extinctions have occurred much earlier in the history of the planet (the dinosaurs, for example), but this wave of extinctions is happening at the hands of humankind. The human remaking of the ecosystem has also greatly increased the presence of plants and animals that have benefited from human activity—cattle, pigs, chickens, rats, wheat, corn, and dandelions. By some estimates, 90 percent of all plant activity now occurs in environments shaped by human action.

The global spread of modern industry, heavily dependent on fossil fuels, created a pall of air pollution in many major cities. By the 1970s, traffic police in Tokyo fre-



quently wore face masks. In Mexico City, officials estimated in 2002 that air pollution killed 35,000 people every year. Industrial pollution in the Soviet Union rendered about half of the country's rivers severely polluted by the late 1980s, while fully 20 percent of its population lived in regions defined as "ecological disasters." The release of chemicals known as chlorofluorocarbons thinned the ozone layer, which protects the earth from excessive ultraviolet radiation.

The most critical and intractable environmental transformation was global warming. By the end of the twentieth century, a worldwide scientific consensus had emerged that the vastly increased burning of fossil fuels, which emit heat-trapping greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, as well as the loss of trees that would otherwise remove it from the air, had begun to warm the atmosphere significantly. By 2010, carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere was about one-third higher than pre-industrial levels. Although considerable disagreement existed about the rate and likely consequences of this process, indications of melting glaciers and polar ice caps, rising sea levels, thawing permafrost, extreme hurricanes, further species extinctions, and other ecological threats have punctuated global discussion of this issue. It was clearly a global phenomenon and, for many people, it demanded global action.

Green and Global

Environmentalism began in the nineteenth century as Romantic poets such as William Blake and William Wordsworth denounced the industrial era's "dark satanic mills," which threatened the "green and pleasant land" of an earlier England. The "scientific management" of nature, both in industrializing countries and in European colonies, represented another element of emerging environmental awareness among a few. So

Map 23.4 Ecological Footprints²⁵

According to a recent study, the overall human footprint on the planet since the 1970s has exceeded the earth's capacity to replace natural resource consumption and to absorb carbon dioxide waste. By 2007, that "overshoot" was about 50 percent. This map shows regional differences in generating that increasingly heavy human footprint on the earth.

PORTRAIT

Rachel Carson, Pioneer of Environmentalism

“Over increasingly large areas of the United States, spring now comes unheralded by the return of the birds, and the early mornings are strangely silent.”²⁶ This was the appalling vision that inspired *Silent Spring*, a book that effectively launched the American environmental movement in 1962 with its devastating critique of unregulated pesticide use. Its author, Rachel Carson, was born in 1907 on a farm near Pittsburgh. Her childhood interest in nature led to college and graduate studies in biology and then a career as a marine biologist with the U.S. Department of Fisheries, only the second woman hired for such a position. She was also finding her voice as a writer, penning three well-received books on the ecology of the sea.

Through this work, Carson gained an acute awareness of the intricate and interdependent web of life, but she assumed that “much of nature was forever beyond the tampering hand of man.” However, the advent of the atomic age, with the dramatic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, shook her confidence that nature was immune to human action, and she began to question the



Rachel Carson
(© Post-Gazette/ZUMA Press/Corbis)

widely held assumption that science always held positive outcomes for human welfare. That skepticism gradually took shape around the issue of pesticides and other toxins deliberately introduced into the environment in the name of progress. In 1958 a letter from a friend describing the death of birds in her yard following aerial spraying for mosquito control prompted Carson to take on a project that became *Silent Spring*. Initially she called it “man against the earth.”

From government agencies, independent scientists, public health specialists, and her own network of contacts, Carson began to assemble data about the impact of pesticides on natural ecosystems and human health. While she never called for

their complete elimination, she argued for much greater care and sensitivity to the environment in employing chemical pesticides. She further urged natural biotic agents as a preferable alternative for pest control. The book also criticized the government regulatory agencies for their negligent oversight and scientific specialists for their “fanatical zeal” to create “a chemically sterile insect-

did the “wilderness idea,” which aimed to preserve untouched areas from human disruption, as, for example, in the U.S. national parks.²⁷ None of these strands of environmentalism attracted a mass following or provoked a global response. Not until the second half of the twentieth century, and then quite rapidly, did environmentalism achieve a worldwide dimension, although it was expressed in many quite different ways.

This second-wave environmentalism began in the West with the publication in 1962 of Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*, exposing the chemical contamination of the environment. (See the Portrait of Rachel Carson, above.) Here, as virtually everywhere else, the impetus for action came from the grass roots and citizen protest. By the early 1990s, some 14 million Americans—one in seven adults—had joined one of the many environmental organizations. In Europe, the Club of Rome, a global

■ Comparison

What differences emerged between environmentalism in the Global North and that in the Global South?

free world.” Chemical companies, she wrote, gave out only “little tranquilizing pills of half-truth” when confronted with evidence of their products’ harmful results. While she worked hard to ensure the book’s scientific credentials, it was a passionate work, fueled by Carson’s “anger at the senseless brutish things that were being done.” It was also a book written under growing personal difficulties. Her mother, for whom she had long been a caretaker, died in 1958, while Carson’s own health too deteriorated as cancer and other ailments took their toll.

When *Silent Spring* finally published in 1962, the book provoked a firestorm of criticism. Velsicol, a major chemical company, threatened a lawsuit to prevent its publication. Critics declared that following her prescriptions would mean “the end of all human progress,” even a “return to the Dark Ages [when] insects and diseases and vermin would once again inherit the earth.” Some of the attacks were more personal. Rachel Carson had never married, and Ezra Taft Benson, a former secretary of agriculture, wondered “why a spinster with no children was so concerned about genetics,” while opining that she was “probably a communist.” It was the height of the cold war era, and challenges to government agencies and corporate capitalism were often deemed “un-American” and “sinister.”

Carson evoked such a backlash because she had called into question the whole idea of science as progress, so central to Western culture since the Enlightenment. Humankind had acquired the power to “alter the very nature of

the [earth’s] life,” she declared. The book ended with a dire warning: “It is our alarming misfortune that so primitive a science has armed itself with the most modern and terrible weapons, and that in turning them against the insects, it has also turned them against the earth.”

But Carson also had a growing number of enthusiastic supporters. Before she died in 1964, she witnessed the vindication of much of her work. Honors and awards poured in; she more than held her own against her critics in a CBS News program devoted to her book; and a presidential Science Advisory Committee cited Carson’s work while recommending the “orderly reduction of persistent pesticides.” Following her death, a range of policy changes reflected her work including the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 and the banning of the insecticide DDT in 1973. *Silent Spring* also motivated many to join the growing array of environmentalist groups.

Approaching her death, Carson applied her ecological understanding of the world to herself as well. In a letter to her best friend not long before she died, she recalled seeing some monarch butterflies leaving on a journey from which they would not return. And then she added: “When the intangible cycle has run its course, it is a natural and not unhappy thing that a life comes to an end.”

Question: In what larger contexts might we understand Rachel Carson and the book that gained her such attention?

think tank, issued a report in 1972 called *Limits to Growth*, which warned of resource exhaustion and the collapse of industrial society in the face of unrelenting economic growth. The German environmental movement was distinctive in that its activists directly entered the political arena as the Green Party, with a focus on opposition to nuclear energy. Beyond addressing environmental pollution, Western activists focused much attention on wilderness issues, opposing logging, road building, and other development efforts in remaining unspoiled areas.

Quite quickly, during the 1970s and 1980s, environmentalism took root in the developing countries as well. There it often assumed a different character: it was more locally based and had fewer large national organizations than in the West; it involved poor people rather than affluent members of the middle class; it was less engaged in

political lobbying and corporate strategies; it was more concerned with issues of food security, health, and basic survival than with the rights of nature or wilderness protection; and it was more closely connected to movements for social justice.²⁸ Thus, whereas Western environmentalists defended forests where few people lived, the Chikpo, or “tree-hugging,” movement in India sought to protect the livelihood of farmers, artisans, and herders living in areas subject to extensive deforestation. A massive movement to prevent or limit the damming of India’s Narmada River derived from the displacement of local people; similar anti-dam protests in the American Northwest were more concerned with protecting salmon runs.

Western environmentalists often called on individuals to change their values by turning away from materialism toward an appreciation of the intricate and fragile web of life that sustains us all. In the Philippines, by contrast, environmental activists confronting the operation of foreign mining companies have sought fundamental changes in the political and social structure of their country. There, environmental protest has overlapped with other movements seeking to challenge established power structures and social hierarchies. Coalitions of numerous local groups—representing various religious, women’s, human rights, indigenous peoples’, peasant, and political organizations—frequently mobilized large-scale grassroots movements against the companies rather than seeking to negotiate with them. Occasionally these movements have included violent actions by “green armies.” Such mass mobilization contributed to the decision of the Australian-based Western Mining Corporation in 2000 to abandon its plans for developing a huge copper mine in Mindanao.

By the late twentieth century, environmentalism had become a matter of global concern. That awareness motivated legislation aimed at pollution control in many countries; it pushed many businesses in a “green” direction; it fostered research on alternative and renewable sources of energy; it stimulated UN conferences on global warming; it persuaded millions of people to alter their way of life; and it generated a number of international agreements addressing matters such as whaling, ozone depletion, and global warming.

The globalization of environmentalism also disclosed sharp conflicts, particularly between the Global North and South. Both activists and governments in the developing countries have often felt that Northern initiatives to address atmospheric pollution and global warming would curtail their industrial development, leaving the North/South gap intact. “The threat to the atmospheric commons has been building over centuries,” argued Indian environmentalist Vandana Shiva, “mainly because of industrial activity in the North. Yet . . . the North refuses to assume extra responsibility for cleaning up the atmosphere. No wonder the Third World cries foul when it is asked to share the costs.” A Malaysian official put the dispute succinctly: “The developed countries don’t want to give up their extravagant lifestyles, but plan to curtail our development.”²⁹ Western governments argued that newly industrializing countries such as China and India must also agree to specific limits on their growing emissions if further global warming is to be prevented. Such deep disagreements between industrialized and developing countries have long contributed to the failure





of global efforts to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But in late 2011, at an international conference in Durban, South Africa, delegates from 194 countries agreed to move toward a climate change treaty that would be legally binding on all parties.

Beyond these and other conflicts, global environmentalism, more than any other widespread movement, came to symbolize “one-world” thinking, a focus on the common plight of humankind across the artificial boundaries of nation-states. It also marked a challenge to modernity itself, particularly its consuming commitment to endless growth. The ideas of sustainability and restraint, certainly not prominent in any list of modern values, entered global discourse and marked the beginnings of a new environmental ethic. This change in thinking was perhaps the most significant achievement of global environmentalism.

Environmentalism in Action

These South Korean environmental activists are wearing death masks and holding crosses representing various countries during an anti-nuclear protest in Seoul in 1996, exactly ten years after a large-scale nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. The lead protester holds a placard reading “Don’t forget Chernobyl!” (AP Photo/Yun Jai-hyoung)



Reflections: Pondering the Past

Everyone who studies world history has been witness to something of the broad contours of the human journey, or at least a part of it. That remarkable field of study involves selectively describing major changes, making frequent comparisons, noticing connections among distant peoples, and explaining, as best we can and amid much

controversy, why things turned out as they did. But world history provides endless raw material for yet another kind of inquiry, that of pondering or musing, turning over in our minds again and again, those fundamentally human and personal questions for which definitive answers are elusive.

Consider, for example, the issue of suffering and compassion. History is, among other things, a veritable catalog of the varieties of human suffering. It provides ample evidence, should we need it, that suffering is a common and bedrock human experience . . . and none of us is exempt. But it also highlights the extent to which that suffering has derived from our own actions in the shape of war, racism, patriarchy, exploitation, inequality, oppression, and neglect. Is it possible that some exposure to the staggering sum of human suffering revealed in the historical record can soften our hearts, fostering compassion for our own suffering and for that of others? Might the study of history generate kindness, expressed at the level of day-to-day personal interactions and at the wider level of acting to repair the brokenness of the world?

A related issue is that of hope, so important for our posture toward both the world and our individual lives. Does history offer a basis for a hopeful outlook? Based on the recent past, it would not be difficult to make a case for despair. The deterioration of environment and the availability of immensely destructive nuclear weapons suggest at least the possibility of a sorry outcome for the human experiment on this planet. The difficulty of achieving agreement about effective remedies for major issues, both within and among nations, only adds to the prospect of an unhappy future.

And yet, individuals and societies have often hovered on the knife-edge of possibility and disaster. But we have survived and even flourished as a species, and civilization has proven resilient in the face of catastrophes such as the Black Death and world wars. Furthermore, things have changed, sometimes for the better, and frequently people have changed things. Abolitionists contributed to the ending of slavery. Colonized peoples broke free of empire. Women secured the vote and defied patriarchy. Socialists and communists challenged the inequities of capitalism, while popular protest brought repressive communist regimes to their knees in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The wonders of modern science and technology have demonstrably improved the lives of billions of people. Thus the historical record offers a wealth of material for pondering the issue of hope.

Yet another question deals with our response to “otherness.” We are, most of us, inclined to be insular, to regard our own ways as the norm, to be fearful of difference. Nor is this tendency largely our own fault. We all have limited experience. Few of us have had much personal encounter with cultures beyond our own, and none of us, of course, knows personally what life was like before we were born. But we do know that a rich and mature life involves opening up to a wider world, and we can be assured that the twenty-first century will demand that we do so. If we base our understanding of life only on what we personally experience, we render ourselves both impoverished and ineffective.

In this task of opening up, history in general and world history in particular have much to offer. They provide a marvelous window into the unfamiliar. They confront

us with the whole panorama of human achievement, tragedy, and sensibility. They give context and perspective to our own limited experience. They allow us some modest entry into the lives of people far removed from us in time and place. And they offer us company for the journey of our own lives. Pondering the global past with a receptive heart and an open mind can assist us in enlarging and deepening our sense of self. In exposing us to the wider experience of “all under heaven,” as the Chinese put it, world history can aid us in becoming wiser and more mature persons. That is among the many gifts, sometimes painful but always enriching, that the study of history offers to us all.

Second Thoughts

What's the Significance?

neoliberalism, 1139–40	fundamentalism, 1156–57
reglobalization, 1140–43	Hindutva, 1157
transnational corporations, 1141–42	Islamic renewal, 1157–62
North/South gap, 1144	Osama bin Laden/al-Qaeda, 1161–62
anti-globalization, 1146–47	global warming, 1165
Prague Spring, 1150	environmentalism, 1165–70
Che Guevara, 1150	Rachel Carson, 1166–67
second-wave feminism, 1151–52	

Big Picture Questions

1. In what ways did the Global North/South divide find expression in the past century?
2. What have been the benefits and drawbacks of globalization since 1945?
3. Do the years since 1914 confirm or undermine Enlightenment predictions about the future of humankind?
4. “The most recent century marks the end of the era of Western dominance in world history.” What evidence might support this statement? What evidence might contradict it?
5. To what extent did the various liberation movements of the past century — communism, nationalism, democracy, feminism, internationalism — achieve their goals?
6. **Looking Back:** To what extent did the processes discussed in this chapter (globalization, feminism, fundamentalism, environmentalism) have roots in the more distant past? In what respects did they represent something new in the past century?

Next Steps: For Further Study

Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God* (2000). A comparison of Christian, Jewish, and Islamic fundamentalism in historical perspective.

Nayan Chanda, *Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization* (2007). An engaging, sometimes humorous, long-term view of the globalization process.

LearningCurve

Check what you know.
bedfordstmartins.com/strayer/LC



Online Study Guide

bedfordstmartins.com/highschool/strayer

For Web sites and additional documents related to this chapter, see **Make History** at bedfordstmartins.com/highschool/strayer.

Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (2006). A thorough, thoughtful, and balanced history of economic globalization.

Michael Hunt, *The World Transformed* (2004). A thoughtful global history of the second half of the twentieth century.

J. R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century World* (2001). A much-acclaimed global account of the rapidly mounting human impact on the environment during the most recent century.

Bonnie Smith, ed., *Global Feminisms since 1945* (2000). A series of essays about feminist movements around the world.

“No Job for a Woman,” <http://www.iwm.org.uk/upload/package/30/women/index.htm>. A Web site illustrating the impact of war on the lives of women in the twentieth century.

Documents

Considering the Evidence: Voices of Global Feminism



With its focus on equal rights and opportunities for women, modern feminism has challenged the most ancient and perhaps deeply rooted of human inequalities—that of patriarchy or the dominance of men over women. Beginning in Western Europe and the United States during the nineteenth century, it was born in the context of democratic gains for men from which women were excluded. Like science, industrialism, socialism, and electoral democracy, feminism was a Western cultural innovation that acquired a global reach during the most recent century.

In doing so, feminism has found expression in many voices, giving rise to much controversy and many questions within feminist circles. How relevant has mainstream Western feminism been to women of color in the West and in the developing countries? What is it precisely that oppresses women—the family, capitalism, cultural assumptions about male superiority, women’s acquiescence to patriarchy? To what extent do all women share common interests? In what ways do differences of class, race, nation, religion, sexual orientation, and economic condition generate quite distinct feminist agendas? How important is sexual freedom to the feminist cause? What tactics are most effective in realizing the varying goals of feminists? The documents that follow provide a sample of the divergent voices in which global feminism has been articulated during the past century.

Document 23.1

Communist Feminism

Following the Russian revolution of 1917, the communist Soviet Union was the site of a remarkable experiment in state-directed feminism during the 1920s. (See Chapter 21, pp. 1046–47.) Among the most prominent leaders of that movement was Alexandra Kollontai (1872–1952), who was born to a privileged, gentry family and became involved in socialist politics and revolution with a focus on women’s issues. For several years, Kollontai was the head

of Zhenotdel, the communist organization dedicated to female emancipation. Her outspokenness on women's issues and her opposition to an emerging Soviet dictatorship soon diminished her influence within Soviet leadership circles. By the 1960s, however, her ideas resonated among some participants in a re-viving feminist movement in the West. Her essay on "Communism and the Family," written in 1920, gives expression to a distinctly communist feminism.

- Why does Kollontai believe that the individual family is both oppressive and doomed?
- How does she imagine the future of marriage and family life under communism?
- To whom might such a vision appeal and who might be deeply offended by it?
- What useful elements might later Western feminists have seen in Kollontai's ideas?

ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

"Communism and the Family"

1920

Will the family continue to exist under communism? ... [One] fact that invites attention is that divorce has been made easier in Soviet Russia. ... A working woman will not have to petition for months or even for years to secure the right to live separately from a husband who beats her and makes her life a misery with his drunkenness and uncouth behaviour. Divorce by mutual agreement now takes no more than a week or two to obtain. ...

[T]he old family in which the man was everything and the woman nothing ... is changing before our very eyes. ... It is the universal spread of female labour that has contributed most of all to the radical change in family life. ... Capitalism has placed a crushing burden on woman's shoulders: it has made her a wage-worker without having reduced her cares as housekeeper or mother. Woman staggers beneath the weight of this triple load. ...

The circumstances that held the family together no longer exist. The family is ceasing to be necessary either to its members or to the nation as a whole. ...

Source: Alexandra Kollontai, "Communism and the Family," *The Worker*, 1920.

All that was formerly produced in the bosom of the family is now being manufactured on a mass scale in workshops and factories. ... The family no longer produces; it only consumes. ... The individual household is dying. It is giving way in our society to collective housekeeping. Instead of the working woman cleaning her flat, the communist society can arrange for men and women whose job it is to go round in the morning cleaning rooms. ... Instead of the working woman having to struggle with the cooking and spend her last free hours in the kitchen preparing dinner and supper, communist society will organise public restaurants and communal kitchens. ... The working woman will not have to slave over the washtub any longer, ... she will simply take these things to the central laundries each week and collect the washed and ironed garments later. ...

Just as housework withers away, so the obligations of parents to their children wither away gradually until finally society assumes the full responsibility. ... Communist society will come to the aid of the parents. In Soviet Russia ... we already have homes for very small babies, creches, kinder-

gartens, children's colonies and homes, hospitals and health resorts for sick children, restaurants, free lunches at school and free distribution of text books, warm clothing and shoes to schoolchildren. All this goes to show that the responsibility for the child is passing from the family to the collective. . . .

In place of the old relationship between men and women, a new one is developing: a union of affection and comradeship, a union of two equal members of communist society, both of them free, both of them independent, and both of them workers. No more domestic bondage for women. No more inequality within the family. No need for women to fear being left without support and with children to bring up. The woman in communist society no longer depends upon her husband but on her work. . . . She need have no anxiety about her

children. The workers' state will assume responsibility for them. Marriage will lose all the elements of material calculation which cripple family life. Marriage will be a union of two persons who love and trust each other. . . . [T]here is no more room for the old proprietary attitude which says: "These are my children. . . ." [T]here are only our children, the children of Russia's communist workers. . . .

In place of the individual and egoistic family, a great universal family of workers will develop, in which all the workers, men and women, will above all be comrades. This is what relations between men and women in the communist society will be like. These new relations will ensure for humanity all the joys of a love unknown in the commercial society, of a love that is free and based on the true social equality of the partners.

Document 23.2

Western Feminism

In the West, where modern feminism had begun in the nineteenth century, a new phase of that movement took shape during the 1960s and after. Moving well beyond the earlier focus on suffrage and property rights, "second-wave" feminists gave voice to a wide range of new issues. Some continued Elizabeth Cady Stanton's emphasis on "equal rights" with a focus now on the home and housework, discrimination in the workplace, access to education, and political involvement. "Socialist feminists" looked to the workings of capitalist economies and their class inequalities as the basis of women's oppression. Still others turned the spotlight on cultural issues—media portrayal of women, sexuality and the family, reproductive rights, lesbianism, violence against women, pornography, and prostitution. Among the spokespersons for this cultural critique of patriarchy was the American writer Andrea Dworkin (1946–2005). In a speech at the University of Toronto in 1995, she spelled out her understanding of the achievements and continuing tasks of modern feminism.

- How does Dworkin's feminist agenda compare with that of Kollontai?
- How does it compare with the ideas of Elizabeth Cady Stanton in Document 16.4, pp. 818–19?
- Why do you think that issues of sexuality and violence against women have been so prominent in recent Western feminism?

ANDREA DWORKIN

“Remember, Resist, Do Not Comply”

1995

I want us to think about far we have come politically.

We have named force as such when it is used against us. . . . It used to be a legal right, for instance, that men had in marriage. They could force their wives to have intercourse and it was not called force or rape; it was called desire or love. We have challenged the old ideology of sexual conquest as a natural game in which women are targets and men are conquering heroes. . . . We have identified rape; we have identified incest; we have identified battery; we have identified prostitution; we have identified pornography—as crimes against women, as means of exploiting women, as ways of hurting women that are systematic and supported by the practices of the societies in which we live. We have identified sexual exploitation as abuse. We have identified objectification and turning women into commodities for sale as dehumanizing, deeply dehumanizing. . . . We have identified patterns of violence that take place in intimate relationships. We know now that most rape is not committed by the dangerous and predatory stranger but by the dangerous and predatory boyfriend, lover, friend, husband, neighbor, the man we are closest to, not the man who is farthest away.

What remains to be done? . . . We need to end rape . . . , incest . . . , battery . . . , prostitution, and . . . pornography. That means that we need to refuse to

accept that these are natural phenomena that just happen because some guy is having a bad day. . . .

In my view, we need to concentrate on the perpetrators of crimes against women instead of asking ourselves over and over and over again, why did that happen to her? . . . There is no women’s movement if it does not include the women who are being hurt and the women who have the least. The women’s movement has to take on the family systems in our countries. . . .

We have to take on prostitution as an issue. . . . Most prostituted women in the West are incest victims who ran away from home, who have been raped, who are pimped when they are still children—raped, homeless, poor, abandoned children. We have to take on poverty: not in the liberal sense of heartfelt concern but in the concrete sense, in the real world. We have to take on what it means to stand up for women who have nothing because when women have nothing, it’s real nothing: no homes, no food, no shelter, often no ability to read.

Now, I know, in this room, some of you are the women I have been talking about. . . . I am going to ask you to use every single thing you can remember about what was done to you—how it was done, where, by whom, when, and, if you know, why—to begin to tear male dominance to pieces, to pull it apart, to vandalize it, to destabilize it. . . . I have to ask you to resist, not to comply, to destroy the power men have over women, to refuse to accept it, to abhor it, and to do whatever is necessary, despite its cost to you, to change it.

Source: Andrea Dworkin, *Life and Death* (New York: Free Press, 1997), 169–78.

Document 23.3**Black American Feminism**

Within North American feminism, a distinctive voice arose among women of color—especially blacks and Hispanics. Many among them resented the claims of white, middle-class feminists to speak for all women and objected to the exclusive prominence given to gender issues. Capitalism, race, class, and

compulsory heterosexuality, they insisted, combined with patriarchy to generate an interlocking system of oppression, unique to women of color. Such a perspective is reflected in the 1977 statement of the Combahee River Collective, a black feminist organization.

- What differences in perspective can you identify between this document and that of Andrea Dworkin in Document 23.2?
- What issues divide black and white feminists in the United States?
- What difficulties have black American feminists experienced in gaining support for their movement?
- On what basis might this statement generate opposition and controversy?

COMBAHEE RIVER COLLECTIVE
A Black Feminist Statement
 1977

We are a collective of Black feminists who have been meeting together since 1974. . . . [W]e are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression . . . based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. . . .

[W]e find our origins in the historical reality of Afro-American women's continuous life-and-death struggle for survival and liberation. . . . Black women have always embodied an adversary stance to white male rule. . . . Black feminist politics also have an obvious connection to movements for Black liberation, particularly those of the 1960s and 1970s. . . . It was our experience and disillusionment within these liberation movements, as well as experience on the periphery of the white male left, that led to the need to develop a politics that was anti-racist, unlike those of white women, and anti-sexist, unlike those of Black and white men. . . . [A]s we developed politically we [also] addressed ourselves to heterosexism and economic oppression under capitalism. . . .

Although we are feminists and Lesbians, we feel solidarity with progressive Black men and do not ad-

vocate the fractionalization that white women who are separatists demand. . . . We struggle together with Black men against racism, while we also struggle with Black men about sexism. . . . We are socialists because we believe that work must be organized for the collective benefit of those who do the work and create the products, and not for the profit of the bosses. . . . We need to articulate the real class situation of persons . . . for whom racial and sexual oppression are significant determinants in their working/economic lives. . . . No one before has ever examined the multilayered texture of Black women's lives. . . . "Smart-ugly" crystallized the way in which most of us had been forced to develop our intellects at great cost to our "social" lives. . . . We have a great deal of criticism and loathing for what men have been socialized to be in this society . . . [b]ut we do not have the misguided notion that it is their maleness, per se—i.e., their biological maleness—that makes them what they are.

The major source of difficulty in our political work is that we are . . . trying . . . to address a whole range of oppressions. . . . We do not have racial, sexual, heterosexual, or class privilege to rely upon. . . . The psychological toll of being a Black woman and the difficulties this presents in reaching political consciousness and doing political work can never be

Source: Zillah R. Eisenstein, ed., *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 362–72.

underestimated. . . . As an early group member once said, “We are all damaged people merely by virtue of being Black women.” . . . The material conditions of most Black women would hardly lead them to upset both economic and sexual arrangements that seem to represent some stability in their lives. . . . Accusations that Black feminism divides the Black struggle are powerful deterrents to the growth of an autonomous Black women’s movement.

The inclusiveness of our politics makes us concerned with any situation that impinges upon the lives of women, Third World and working people. . . . One issue that is of major concern to us and that we have begun to publicly address is racism in the white women’s movement. . . . Eliminating racism in the white women’s movement is by definition work for white women to do, but we will continue to speak to and demand accountability on this issue. . . .

Document 23.4

Islamic Feminism

Beyond the Western world and the communist world, modern feminism has also found expression in the developing countries (see pp. 1152–53). Nowhere has this provoked greater controversy than in the Islamic world. For a few women, exposure to Western gender norms and liberal thought has occasioned the abandonment of Islam altogether. (See Document 22.4, pp. 1126–28.) Far more common have been efforts to root gender equality in both personal and public life within the traditions of Islam. Such was the argument of Benazir Bhutto, several times the prime minister of Pakistan, in a speech delivered in 1985.

- On what basis does Bhutto argue that “Islam provides justice and equality for women”?
- How does she account for the manifest inequality of women in so many Muslim societies?
- How do you think Kemal Atatürk (Document 22.1, p. 1120), the Ayatollah Khomeini (Document 22.2, p. 1122), and Ayaan Hirsi Ali (Document 22.4, p. 1126) might respond to Bhutto’s ideas?
- How might you compare Bhutto’s case for feminism with those of the communist and American writers in the preceding documents?

BENAZIR BHUTTO

Politics and the Muslim Woman

1985

[O]ne of the first things that we must appreciate about the religion of Islam is that there is no one interpretation to it. . . .

I would describe Islam in two main categories: reactionary Islam and progressive Islam. We can

have a reactionary interpretation of Islam which tries to uphold the status quo, or we can have a progressive interpretation of Islam which tries to move with a changing world, which believes in human dignity, which believes in consensus,

and which believes in giving women their due right. . . .

I believe that Islam within it provides justice and equality for women, and I think that those aspects of Islam which have been highlighted by the *mullas* [religious scholars] do not do a service to our religion. . . . But . . . as more and more people in Muslim countries, both men and women, achieve education and begin to examine the Qur'an in the light of their education, they are beginning not to agree with the *mullas* on their orthodox or reactionary version of Islam.

Let us start with the story of the Fall. Unlike Christianity, it is not Eve who tempts Adam into tasting the apple and being responsible for original sin. According to Islam—and I mention this because I believe that Islam is an egalitarian religion—both Adam and Eve are tempted, both are warned, both do not heed the warning, and therefore the Fall occurs.

As far as opportunity is concerned, in Islam there is equal opportunity for both men and women. I refer to the Sura *Ya Sin* [Quran 36, 34–35], which says: “We produce orchids and date gardens and vines, and we cause springs to gush forth, that they may enjoy the fruits of it.” God does not give fruits, orchids, or the fruit of the soil just for men to enjoy or men to plow; he gives it for both men and women. . . . Sura *an-Nisa* [Quran 4, 32]: “To men is allotted what they earn, and to women what they earn.” . . .

The references [in the Quran] are to men and women. . . . The attributes are the same. Both are the creatures of God. Both have certain rights. Both have certain duties. . . . [T]hey have to give alms to the needy, they have to help orphans—the behavior is applicable to both men and women. It is not re-

ligion which makes the difference. The difference comes from man-made law. It comes from the fact that soon after the Prophet died, it was not the Islam of the Prophet that remained. What took place was the emergence or the reassertiveness of the patriarchal society, and religion was taken over to justify the norms of the tribal society. . . .

[About] the right of divorce and polygamy. It is often said that Islam provides for four wives for a man. But in my interpretation of this, and in the interpretation of many other Muslims, that is simply not true.

What the Qur'an does say, and I quote: “Marry as many women as you wish, wives two or three or four. If you fear not to treat them equally, marry only one. . . . I doubt you will be able to be just between your wives, even if you try” [Quran 4:3, 129]. So if God Himself and His message says that He doubts that you can be equal, I don't know how any man can turn around and say that “God has given me this right to get married more than once.”

I would like to say that within Islamic history there are very strong roles for women. For instance, the Prophet's wife, Bibi Khadija, was a woman of independent means. She had her own business, she traded, she dealt with society at large, she employed the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, when he was a young boy, and subsequently, Bibi Khadija herself sent a proposal [of marriage] to the Prophet. So she is the very image of somebody who is independent, assertive, and does not conform to the passive description of women in Muslim societies that we have grown accustomed to hearing about. . . .

So when we have such powerful role models of women . . . then one must ask, why is it that today in Muslim countries, one does not see that much of women? . . . Why is it that women are secluded? Why is it that women are subject to social control? Why is it that women are not given their due share of property? . . . It has got nothing to do with the religion, but it has got very much to do with material or man-made considerations. . . . It is not Islam which is averse to women rulers, I think—it is men.

Source: Benazir Bhutto, “Politics and the Muslim Woman,” transcript of audio recording, April 11, 1985, in *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook*, ed. Charles Kurzman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 107–11.

Document 23.5

Mexican Zapatista Feminists

Mexican feminists, like those in much of Latin America, have operated in societies shaped by widespread poverty, sharp class inequalities, racial and ethnic conflict, and frequently authoritarian or corrupt governments. Thus feminists have often sought to address the ways in which multiple sources of oppression, not only gender relations, affect both women and men. Such was the case in the Zapatista rebellion that erupted in 1994 among the Maya people in the Chiapas region of southern Mexico. It was a protest against a long history of injustice and impoverishment for indigenous peoples. Women activists within this largely peasant movement had to confront the sexist attitudes of their male comrades as well as an oppressive Mexican government that marginalized its Maya citizens. Although they usually rejected the “feminist” label, these women articulated their demands in an Indigenous Women’s Petition and succeeded in embedding their concerns in a Women’s Revolutionary Law, both of which are reproduced here.

- How would you describe the issues that these documents articulate? How do they reflect class, ethnic, and gender realities of Mexican life?
- Should these documents be regarded as feminist? Why or why not? Why might Zapatista women be reluctant to call themselves feminists?
- Which of these demands might provoke the strongest male resistance? Why?
- With which of the previous feminist statements might Zapatista women be most sympathetic?

Indigenous Women’s Petition

March 1, 1994

We the indigenous *campesina* women ask for the immediate solution to our urgent needs, which the government has never met.

Sources: “The Zapatista Women: The Movement from Within,” app. II, “Indigenous Women’s Petition,” Zapatista Women, accessed March 20, 2012, <http://www.actlab.utexas.edu/~geneve/zapwomen/goetze/thesis.html> (first excerpt); *Zapatistas! Documents of the New Mexican Revolution* (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1994) (second excerpt).

1. Child birth clinics with gynecologists. . . .
2. Day care centers. . . .
3. Enough food for the children . . . such as milk, corn starch, rice, corn, soy, oil, beans, cheese, eggs, sugar, soup, oatmeal.
4. Kitchens and dining halls, with all the necessary equipment, for the children in the communities.
5. Corn mills and tortilla-makers . . . according to the number of families in each area.
6. [M]aterials necessary to raise chickens, rabbits, sheep, pigs, etc., including technical advice and veterinary services.

7. [O]vens and necessary materials to build bakeries.
8. [C]raft workshops ...including machinery and materials.
9. [A] market where crafts can be sold at a fair price.
10. Schools ...where women can receive technical training.
11. [P]re-schools and day-care centers in rural communities.
12. [S]ufficient transportation to move from one place to another and to transport the products of our various projects.

The Women's Revolutionary Law

January 1, 1994

[T]aking into account the situation of the woman worker in Mexico, the revolution supports their just demands for equality and justice in the following Women's Revolutionary Law.

First: Women, regardless of their race, creed, color or political affiliation, have the right to participate in the revolutionary struggle in a way determined by their desire and capacity.

Second: Women have the right to work and receive a just salary.

Third: Women have the right to decide the number of children they will have and care for.

Fourth: Women have the right to participate in the affairs of the community and hold positions of

authority if they are freely and democratically elected.

Fifth: Women and their children have the right to primary attention in matters of health and nutrition.

Sixth: Women have the right to an education.

Seventh: Women have the right to choose their partner, and are not to be forced into marriage.

Eighth: Women shall not be beaten or physically mistreated by their family members or by strangers. Rape and attempted rape will be severely punished.

Ninth: Women will be able to occupy positions of leadership in the organization and hold military ranks in the revolutionary armed forces.

Using the Evidence: Voices of Global Feminism

1. **Identifying similarities:** What common concerns animate these documents?
 2. **Defining differences:** What variations or conflicting feminist perspectives can you identify in these sources? What accounts for those differences?
 3. **Considering change over time:** How do you think Elizabeth Cady Stanton (see Document 16.4, p. 818) and nineteenth-century Western feminists in general would have responded to each of these twentieth-century statements?
 4. **Evaluating global feminism:** What aspects of global feminism were most revolutionary, liberating, or threatening to established authorities and ways of living? To what extent do you think the goals of these varying feminist efforts have been realized?
-

Visual Sources

Considering the Evidence: Experiencing Globalization



Not many people in the world of the early twenty-first century remain untouched by globalization. For most of humankind, the pervasive processes of interaction among distant peoples has shaped the clothing we wear, the foods we eat, the products we consume, the ways we work, the music we listen to, the religions we practice, and the identities we assume. Globalization has bound the various peoples of the planet more tightly together and in some respects has made us more alike. Almost all of us, for example, live in nation-states and seek the health, wealth, and prosperity that modern science and technology promise. And yet in other ways we are very different, divided, and conflicted. The enormous gap in wealth between the rich countries of the Global North and the poorer nations of the Global South represents a sharp and quite recent rift in the human community. The visual sources that follow illustrate just a few of the ways in which the world's peoples have experienced globalization in recent decades and have responded to it.

Among the common experiences of globalization for some people living in Asia, Africa, or Latin America has been that of working in foreign-owned production facilities. Companies in wealthier countries have often found it advantageous to build such facilities in places where labor is less expensive or environmental regulations are less restrictive. China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Mexico, Brazil, and various African states are among the countries that have hosted foreign-owned manufacturing operations. The worst of them—in terms of child labor, low pay, few benefits, and dangerous working conditions—have been called “sweatshops.” Such abuses have generated an international movement challenging those conditions. Visual Source 23.1 illustrates an interesting twist on this common feature of a globalized world economy—a Chinese-owned company producing Western-style blue jeans in Lesotho, a small country in southern Africa.

- Why might China, itself the site of many foreign-owned factories, place such a factory in Africa? What does this suggest about the changing



Visual Source 23.1 Globalization and Work (brianafrica/Alamy)

position of China in the world economy? What is the significance of the blue jeans for an understanding of contemporary globalization?

- Does this photograph conform to your image of a sweatshop? Why might many developing countries accept foreign-owned production facilities, despite the criticisms of the working conditions in them?
- Why do you think most of the workers in this photo are women? How might you imagine their motivations for seeking this kind of work? Keep in mind that the unemployment rate in Lesotho in the early twenty-first century was 45 percent.
- What differences can you observe between the workers in this assembly factory and those in the Indian call center shown on page 1140? What similarities might you identify?

If globalization offered employment opportunities—albeit in often wretched conditions—to some people in the developing countries, it also promoted a worldwide culture of consumerism. That culture placed the accumulation of material goods, many of them of Western origin, above older values of spiritual attainment or social responsibility. Nowhere has this culture of consumerism

been more prominent than in China, where the fading of Maoist communism, the country's massive economic growth, and its new openness to the wider world combined to generate an unabashed materialism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. A popular slogan suggested that life in modern China required the "eight bigs": color TV, refrigerator, stereo, camera, motorcycle, a suite of furniture, washing machine, and an electric fan. Visual Source 23.2 illustrates this culture of consumerism as well as one of the "eight bigs" in a poster from the post-Mao era. The poster on page 1062 in Chapter 21 provides further illustration of Chinese consumerism.

- In what ways might these images be used to illustrate Westernization, modernization, globalization, and consumerism?
- How might the young people on the motorcycle understand their own behavior? Do you think they are conscious of behaving in Western ways or have these ways become Chinese? What is the significance of a Chinese couple riding a Suzuki motorcycle, a Japanese product probably manufactured in China under a license agreement?
- Beyond consumerism, how does this poster reflect changes in relationships between men and women in China after Mao? Is this yet another face of globalization or does it remain a distinctly Western phenomenon?
- How might these images be read as a celebration of Chinese success? How might they be used to criticize contemporary Chinese society?

During the last several decades of the twentieth century, the process of economic globalization spawned various movements of resistance and criticism (see pp. 1165–69). In dozens of developing countries, protesters demonstrated or rioted against government policies that removed subsidies, raised prices on essential products, froze salaries, or cut back on social services. Because such policies were often required by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund as a condition for receiving much-needed loans, protesters often directed their anger at these international financial institutions. In the wealthier countries of the world as well, activists have mounted large-scale protests against what they see as the abuses of unregulated corporate power operating in the world economy. Visual Source 23.3 shows a display of this anger that occurred during the protests in Seattle that coincided with the 1999 gathering of the World Trade Organization.

- How does this image reflect the concerns of globalization's many critics? What political message does it convey?
- Why have these criticisms come to focus so heavily on the activities of the World Trade Organization?
- To what groups of people might such images be most compelling? How might advocates of corporate globalization respond to these protesters?




Visual Source 23.2 Globalization and Consumerism (IISH/Stefan R. Landsberger collections
<http://chineseposters.net>)

**Visual Source 23.3**

Globalization and
Protest (Michael
McGuerty)

Visual Source 23.4, a composite satellite photograph of the world at night taken in late 2000, reflects three aspects of the globalization process. The first is the growing consciousness of the earth as a single place, the common home of humankind. Such thinking has been fostered by and expressed in those many remarkable images of the earth taken from space or from the moon (see the photo on p. 1136). In such photographs no artificial boundaries of state or nation are visible, just a solitary planet cast against the immeasurable vastness of space. Second, this photograph shows the globalization of electricity, a central feature of modern life, which has taken place since the late nineteenth century. Finally, this image discloses sharp variations in modern development across the planet as the twenty-first century dawned.

- To what extent has your thinking about the earth and its inhabitants been shaped by images such as this?
- Based on the electrification evident in this photo, what does this image show about the economic divisions of the world in the early twenty-first century?
- Does this image support or contradict the Snapshot on page 1145? What features of this image might you find surprising?




Visual Source 23.4 Globalization: One World or Many? (NASA/GSFC Digital Archive)

Using the Evidence: Experiencing Globalization

1. **Defining differences:** Based on these visual sources and the text of Chapter 23, in what different ways have various groups of people experienced globalization since the end of World War II?
 2. **Noticing change:** Based on these visual sources and those in the text of Chapter 23 as well, in what respects does contemporary globalization differ from that of earlier times? What continuities might you observe? Consider in particular the question of who is influencing who. Does recent globalization represent largely the impact of the West on the rest of the world or is it more of a two-way street?
 3. **Making assessments:** Opinions about contemporary globalization depend heavily on the position of observers—their class, gender, or national locations. How might you illustrate this statement from the visual sources in this chapter?
 4. **Seeking further evidence:** What additional images might add to this effort to illustrate visually the various dimensions of globalization? What visual sources do you think might be added to it fifty or a hundred years from now?
-

Chapter 23 Wrap Up



STEP ONE

The Words to Know: Transnational/supranational

International organizations, as well as corporations, can be both transnational and supranational. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines *transnational* as “extending or having interests extending beyond national bounds or frontiers; multinational.” The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines *supranational* as “having power or influence that overrides or transcends national boundaries, governments, or institutions.” Using evidence from the text, write an essay about the roles that transnational and supranational organizations play in confronting one of the following global challenges: the environment, the economy, gender equity, or religious understanding. In your essay, you might also consider the limitations of these kinds of organizations in meeting these challenges.

STEP TWO

The Development of Global Environmentalism

Using the text as well as the timelines on pages 1089 and 1139, Map 23.4 on p. 1165, and the Snapshots on pages 1104 and 1145, consider the rise of environmentalism over the past 50 years and how environmentalism fits into the larger story of world history by answering the questions below.

■ Questions

1. What environmental issues is the world currently facing?
2. How has the growth of population contributed to the environmental challenges we face today?
3. How has globalization helped to both aggravate environmental problems as well as help to find global solutions to these contemporary challenges?
4. What events on the timeline on p. 1139 can be linked together to show why there was a new wave of ecological consciousness after 1960?
5. Based on your understanding of Chapter 23, what more do you need to know to explain fully the global historical context of environmentalism?

STEP THREE**Environmentalism, Sustainability, and Consumerism**

Consider the relationship among globalization, sustainable development, consumerism, and climate change, taking into account the impact that they have on the Global South. First examine the Snapshot on page 1145, the narrative on pp. 1163–69, and the visual sources section on pp. 1182–87. Then write an essay addressing the problems and possible solutions involved in one of the following issues that global development raises: climate change or sustainability or consumerism.